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The aim of this paper is to investigate how risk attitudes in medical decisions for others vary across 
health contexts. A lab experiment was designed to elicit the risk attitudes of 257 medical and non-
medical students by assigning them the role of a physician who must decide between treatments for 
patients. An interval regression model was used to estimate individual coefficients of relative risk 
aversion, and an estimation model was used to test for the effect of type of medical decision and 
experimental design characteristics on elicited risk aversion. We find that: (i) risk attitudes vary across 
different health contexts, but risk aversion prevails in all of them; (ii) students enrolled in health-related 
degrees show a higher degree of risk aversion; and (iii) real rewards for third parties (patients) make 
subjects less risk-averse. The results underline the importance of accounting for attitudes towards risk in 
medical decision-making. 
Keywords: medical decisions for others, risk aversion, health contexts, laboratory experiment, multiple 
price list format. 
JEL Codes: I1, C91, D81  
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Risk preference has been shown to influence a variety of behaviors under conditions of 
uncertainty. As would be expected, given the prevalence of such conditions surrounding 
questions of healthcare provision, there is an extensive literature on risk attitudes in the health 
sector, most of which focuses on measuring patient preferences and propensity towards risk. 
Physicians’ risk attitude is also an important element of service provision, but to date it has 
received comparatively little attention. The question of whether to administer one treatment 
or another to a patient is a problem confronted by physicians on a daily basis. In such 
situations, the physician’s attitude towards risk may affect diagnosis patterns and treatment 
recommendations (Nightingale and Carter, 1987; Sommers and Zeckhauser, 2008; Chandra et 
al., 2012; Michel-Lepage et al., 2013; Massin et al., 2015 and Schosser et al., 2016).
1
 Thus, a 
study that elicits risk preferences in medical decisions for others could contribute to a better 
understanding of the diagnostic and therapeutic decisions that direct medical practice. 
In addition, the stability of risk preferences is a crucial question among economists, 
psychologists and behavioral researchers. Economists have generally assumed that individuals 
exhibit a single risk preference that governs risk-taking behavior in all circumstances. However, 
this has been debated within the psychology literature, as there is evidence that risk attitudes 
vary across different outcomes and domains (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Weber et al., 
2002, Hanoch et al., 2006). In fact, recent economic pap rs have also acknowledged the 
existence of domain-specific risk preferences (Barseghyan et al., 2011, Einav et al., 2012, Galizzi 
et al, 2016a). However, with the exception of van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008), Ruggeri and van 
der Pol (2012) (hereafter VdP&R, 2008, 2012) and Schosser et al. (2016), we are not aware of 




                                                           
1
 For instance, Michel-Lepage et al. (2013) and Massin et al. (2015) show how risk aversion affects physicians’ decisions regarding vaccination 
and the use of antibiotics for treating streptococcal infections, respectively. 
2
 Butler et al. (2012) also acknowledge such differences and develop a medical risk domain subscale for DOSPERT—the most frequently used 
test to differentiate risk attitudes across different domains—that includes blood donation, kidney donation, daily medication use for allergies, 
knee replacement surgery, general anesthesia in dentistry, and clinical trial participation as items. 



































































With these questions in mind, this paper contributes to this scarce literature on risk attitudes in 
the health domain by applying an experimental economics approach. The use of controlled 
laboratory experiments in health economics is growing (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011; Buckley 
et al., 2012; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Brosig-Koch et al.,2016; Galizzi and Wiesen, in press), 
as these experiments enable researchers to investigate health topics for which field evidence is 
difficult to obtain. 
We carried out a lab experiment with 257 students by assigning them the role of a physician 
who must decide between treatments for patients in different contexts. Our aim was to 
investigate whether the risk attitudes of these subjects vary across outcomes within the health 
domain. Our investigation focused on risk attitudes when deciding for others, i.e., the students 
acted as doctors prescribing treatments for their patients. Risk attitudes in “decisions for 
others” have received much less attention in the health domain than in decisions for oneself. 
However, there is evidence that physicians recommend different treatments for patients than 
they would choose for themselves (Ubel et al., 2011; García-Retamero and Galesic, 2012).
3
 
In order to investigate whether risk attitudes are context-dependent, we introduced three 
health contexts that correspond to three different types of medical decisions: a context with 
outcomes expressed as years of life in perfect health, a context of a terminal illness with 
outcomes expressed as months of life in moderate-ill health, and a context with outcomes 
expressed as hours of pain alleviated after surgery. 
We run our experiment with medical students as well as students enrolled in other non-medical 
degrees, which allow us to approximate physicians’ decisions and to test for the effects of 
university degree (health related versus non-health related) on treatment choices. 
Finally, it is important to note that most of the health literature on preference elicitation has 
used hypothetical questions (see Galizzi et al., 2016a for a review). In the money domain there 
is mixed evidence about whether risk attitudes differ depending on whether hypothetical or 
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 Similar patterns of behavior have been documented in studies in the money domain, although the results of these studies on risk aversion are 
mixed. Sutter (2009) and Chakravarty et al (2011) find increased risk taking on behalf of others, while Reynolds et al. (2009), Eriksen and Kvaloy 
(2010) and Anderson et al. (2016) find the opposite result. 



































































real rewards are used. While some find that risk attitudes differ between hypothetical and 
money-rewarded questions (Holt and Laury 2002, 2005 -hereafter H&L, 2002, 2005-; Harrison 
and Rutström, 2008b), others suggest that there is no such difference (Camerer and Hogarth, 
1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Bardsley et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 
2016). As this question is still being debated, and evidence from health experiments with real 
rewards is scarce, we are interested to determine whether elicited preferences for health 
treatments differ between purely hypothetical frameworks and frameworks where real rewards 
are at stake. For this purpose, participants in the real group were informed that the money 
obtained as a result of their medical decisions would be transferred to an internationally known 
non-profit institution that provides medical services for the poorest populations in India. 
In order to elicit preferences, we used a multiple price list (MPL) method, using the well-known 
test developed by H&L in 2002. The H&L method has been widely used in experimental 
economics to evaluate risk preferences in a variety of contexts (Andersen et al., 2008; Charness 
and Viceisza, 2017; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; see Philippin and Crosetto, 2016 for a review on 
H&L experiments).
4
 However, it has been scarcely applied in the health domain, where 
standard gamble methods are the most commonly used methods to elicit preferences towards 
health risks. The exceptions are Galizzi et al. (2016a) and Galizzi et al. (2016b), which adapt the 
questions of H&L (2002) to the health domain in order to analyze whether patients’ risk 
preferences differ across the health and financial domains and whether risk preferences differ 
between patients and their doctors. The H&L method presents a structured menu of binary 
choices, where lotteries are compared in pairs, thereby providing interval estimates of risk 
aversion. The advantage of H&L method is that it has risk in both lotteries (Farquhar, 1984), 
which avoids the “certainty effect”
5
 identified as a weakness of the Standard Gamble and 
makes it easier for subjects to understand and choose an option.
6
 Moreover, there is evidence 
                                                           
4 The prevalent use of the Holt–Laury measure has allowed researchers to compare risk attitudes across a wide array of contexts and 
environments. In turn, this has facilitated a less fragmented approach to the study of risk preferences that minimizes methodological 
differences and aims to characterize a more general phenomenon (Charness et al. 2013). 
5
 Standard gamble compares a lottery with a certain option. This can overweight the certain option as outlined by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). 
6
 In addition, as Holt and Laury (2013) state: “having lotteries for both options controls for a difference in complexity, i.e. the time required to 
determining the payoff, or a preference for playing or avoiding the lottery independently of the probabilities involved.” 
 



































































suggesting that Expected Utility is more descriptively valid when subjects compare pairs of non-
degenerate gambles (Bleichrodt et al., 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Since the H&L method can 
potentially result in a bias toward the choice of options located in the middle of the table where 
risk neutrality is defined (Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2007a; Harrison and Rutström, 
2008a; Lévy-Garboua et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2013), we followed Andersen et al. (2006) 
and developed two asymmetric frames that are skewed in opposite directions. 
Our results confirm that risk preferences are context dependent. Although risk aversion 
dominates in all types of medical decisions, participants in the experiment seem to exhibit more 
risk aversion in the context of hours of pain alleviated. The finding that risk aversion differs 
according to context corroborates previous studies (VdP&R, 2008, 2012) but the finding that 
our subjects are clearly risk averse in all contexts does not. Our findings also show that students 
who are enrolled in health-related degrees were more risk averse than students from other 
degrees. Finally, we find that introducing real rewards that affect others (i.e. patients) seems to 
make subjects less risk averse. Regarding the asymmetric frames, biases or “skewness effects” 
are small and do not affect the main conclusions of the paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we present our research questions. 
Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures for collecting data. Section 4 
explains the methods followed. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 discusses the 
results and concludes with suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Research Questions 
In addition to eliciting preferences toward risk in medical decisions for others, this paper seeks 
to address three research questions: 
Research Question 1: Is risk attitude context-dependent in the health domain, i.e., is risk 
aversion constant for all types of medical decisions? 



































































As mentioned in the previous section, recent economic papers have acknowledged the 
existence of domain-specific risk preferences. For instance, households are more risk averse 
when making choices about home insurance as compared to car insurance (Barseghyan et al., 
2011). Or, similarly, individuals are less risk averse in the financial domain as compared to the 
health domain (Galizzi et al, 2016a). Based on these findings, it seems likely that different risk 
attitudes can be found across different kinds of medical problems (see also Nightingale and 
Carter 1987; Michel-Lepage et al. 2013, Massin et al 2015 and Schosser et al 2016). Using the 
certainty equivalent method and the probability equivalent method, VdP&R (2008, 2012) find 
that risk attitudes in the health sector are indeed context dependent: individuals tend to be risk 
averse with respect to gambles that involve risk of immediate death and risk seeking in gambles 
involving quality of life, although they find conflicting evidence in the case of gambles involving 
life expectancy without risk of immediate death.
7 
In this paper we aim to provide further 
evidence concerning the variation of risk attitude across medical contexts, in this case using a 
different elicitation method procedure based on H&L’s measure of risk aversion. Accordingly, in 
the experiment we designed three different health contexts that had not been previously 
analyzed for this purpose in the literature.  
Research question 2: Are students enrolled in health-related degrees different from others 
regarding risk aversion? 
The experimental literature has shown that there are diff rences of risk preference across 
different subgroups, as found between men and women (Byrnes et al., 1999), between young 
and old (Harrison et al., 2007b), and between novices and experts (Dyer et al. 1989). Moreover, 
different papers show that medical students behave differently in areas such as other-regarding 
motivation and moral behavior (Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Jagsi and Lehmann, 2004). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that risk preferences differ between medical students 
(future physicians) and non-medical students since the former have higher awareness of the 
benefits and risks involved in health treatments. In our experiment students from health and 
non-health degrees were recruited in a proportion of 2 to 1. 
                                                           
7
 In the 2008 paper they found that subjects were risk seeking in this case while in the 2012 paper they were risk averse. 



































































Research question 3: Do real rewards play a role in eliciting preferences for treatments if 
the payments affect a third party? 
Several well-known studies in the literature that compare hypothetical versus money-rewarded 
questions have yielded results indicating a higher degree of risk aversion for the group with real 
rewards (H&L, 2002, 2005; Harrison and Rutström, 2008b). Others, however, do not find 
significant differences (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Bardsley et 
al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2016). However, all of these studies were carried 
out in the money domain and participants made decisions for themselves. As it cannot be 
assumed that the same effects will show up in other domains, it is important to investigate how 
real rewards affect risk attitudes in the health domain when participants make treatment 
decisions for others. For this purpose, half of the subjects in our experiment were allocated to a 
treatment where their decisions had "real" consequences for patients outside the lab. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
3.1. Experimental Design 
The experiment comprises three parts: (i) A MPL task with a monetary outcome, (ii) two MPL 
tasks with health outcomes, (iii) one MPL task to elicit equity preferences in health.  
The results of the two MPL tasks with health outcomes (Part 2 of the experiment) are the main 
data for our analysis. The MPL task with monetary outcomes (Part 1 of the experiment) was 
always presented first and functioned as a practice question. The idea behind this is that 
subjects would more readily understand the MPL task with a familiar outcome like money. The 
data in Part 3 will be analyzed in a different paper. The order of the tasks of Part 2 (tasks 2h and 
2l, for the skewed-high and skewed-low frames) and the equity task of Part 3 were randomized 
to test for order effects, so that the following sequences were used: 2h-2l-3, 2l-2h-3, 3-2h-2l 
and 3-2l-2h (note that the two tasks of Part 2 were always adjacent). At the end of the sessions, 
subjects were asked to fill in a socio-demographic questionnaire. 



































































We used a between-subjects design to respond to our three research questions, and a within-
subjects design to test for frame-related biases. In order to implement our design a total of 24 
groups (3 health contexts x 2 incentive groups x 4 task sequences) with different questionnaires 
were needed. Table 1 summarizes our group design. Notice also that each group consisted of a 
combination of students from health and non-health degrees in a ratio of 2:1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.2. Implementation of the Multiple Price List 
The goal of the experiment was to analyze risk aversion across three different medical contexts. 
In each context, subjects had to choose between pairs of lotteries R and S, where R stands for 
Risky and S for Safe. Let us assume that four health outcomes are ordered from best to worst as 
follows: H1>H2>H3>H4. The R lottery will be characterized by (p,H1;H4) and the S lottery by 
(q,H2;H3) where p and q are the probabilities of the best outcome in each lottery. We used 
three different types of health outcomes (H), described in subsection 3.3. The “no choice” 
option (doing nothing) was always stochastically dominated by the R lottery since H4 was at 
least as good as “no choice.” Following H&L (2002), participants faced a table with 11 decision 
rows
8
 each of which presents a choice between an S gamble (q,H2;H3), labeled treatment A in 
the experiment, and a R gamble (p,H1;H4), labeled treatment B. In each row p=q. In the first 
row p=q=0, and in the eleventh row p=q=1. As we move from the first to the eleventh row, the 
probability of the best outcome increases by 10%. The payoffs or health outcomes remain 
constant. For this reason, in the first row S stochastically dominates R and in the eleventh row R 
stochastically dominates S. In every row, the subject has to choose between S and R. As we 
move down in the table, the expected value of both treatments/lotteries increases as the 
probability of the high health outcome increases, but the expected value of treatment B 
increases more quickly than the expected value of treatment A. Thus, only risk-seeking subjects 
would take Option B in the second decision and only risk-averse subjects would choose Option 
                                                           
8
 H&L have 10 rows, where the last row gives probability 1 to the highest outcome of each lottery. We present 11 rows, adding a row where the 
lowest outcome of each lottery/treatment get probability 1. 



































































B in the second to last decision. The expectation is that a risk neutral subject should cross over 
to Option B when the expected value of each option is about the same. 
 
3.3. The Health Contexts 
We used three decision contexts corresponding to three types of medical decisions. In each 
context, the physician does not know the probability of success or failure of the treatment since 
it changes with unrevealed patient characteristics. 
1. Health context 1 (health gains in years of life in perfect health): Subjects were told that the 
patient had been diagnosed with a disease X. They had to choose between two treatments 
(A or B) that prolong life for several years in perfect health. Outcomes H1 to H4 were 
described in terms of life years gained in perfect health. We chose this health context 
because it has been shown that subjects have certain aspirations regarding life expectancy 
(Verhoef et al., 1994), which can lead to risk-seeking or risk-averse attitudes depending on 
these aspirations. 
2. Health context 2 (health gains in months of life in moderate ill-health for patients with 
reduced life expectancy): Subjects were told that the patient had been diagnosed with a 
terminal disease X that cannot be cured and that is reasonably expected to result in the 
death of the patient within a short period. Subjects had to choose between two treatments 
(A or B) that could prolong life a few months. Outcomes H1 to H4 were described in terms 
of months of life gained in moderate ill-health.
9 
 This context is highly relevant as risk and 
uncertainty are common elements of critical care situations (Nightingale and Grant, 1987). 
For instance, this type of context is commonly found in cases where critical decision-making 
leads to the rejection of new cancer drugs because of their high cost.10  
3. Health context 3 (health gains in hours of pain alleviated): Subjects were told that they were 
treating a patient who had just undergone surgery. The patient would endure acute pain 
                                                           
9
 Following the EQ-5D instrument, we define moderate ill-health as a condition that requires the limitation of daily activities (work, social life, 







































































that would be particularly strong in the first 48 hours after surgery but would disappear in 4 
or 5 days. Subjects had to choose between treatment A and B in order to alleviate pain. 
Thus, outcomes H1 to H4 were described in terms of hours of pain alleviated after surgery. 
Treatment of pain is highly debated within the clinical community, and it is not clear 
whether more risk-averse physicians are willing to apply stronger painkillers or, on the 




The three selected contexts accurately portray the kinds of dilemmas that physicians confront 
regularly in medical practice. They reproduce a range of conditions from minor to critical (for 
example, end of life contexts) and thereby establish a basis for comparison between distinct 
scenarios, which may indicate differences in the degree of risk aversion estimated for each 
context. We have considered it especially important to include a context of pain treatment and 
a context of reduced quality of life (end of life context), as it has been observed that 
preferences for health problems involving quality of life can differ from preferences in 
situations where outcomes are defined in terms of duration (Attema et al.,2013; Attema, et al. 
2016). 
Notice that the outcomes H1 to H4 took the same values in each of the three health contexts. 
What distinguishes the contexts is the type of medical decision faced by the subjects, which 
implies that the interpretation of outcomes differs across contexts (several years of life-
expectancy in perfect health, few months of life-expectancy in moderate ill-health, and hours of 
pain alleviated). Notice also that none of our three contexts is defined in the loss domain since 
subjects in the experiment always face choices about possible gains for their patients. 
 
3.4. The frames 
In order to control for the potential bias toward selecting the middle row, we followed 
Andersen et al. (2006) and developed two asymmetric frames in which the implied risk 
attitudes of the middle row are different. We devised the two frames using a simple procedure 
inspired by Artinger et al. (2014). In the first frame, H1=39, H2=16, H3=12, and H4=4, and the 
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 See for instance https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/17/chronic-pain-management-opioids/) 



































































interpretation of these figures changes with each health context. So, in the first context, 39 
refers to 39 years in perfect health; in the second context it refers to the number of months in 
moderate ill-health before death; and in the third context it refers to the number of hours of 
pain alleviated. The second frame we proposed was almost identical to the first except that the 
best outcome was 19 instead of 39. This use of two frames generated two skewed distributions: 
Frame “high skew” corresponded to a scenario in which a risk-neutral person would choose the 
safe option (S) in the first three rows and then would switch to the risky option (R) as indicated 
by the following pattern SSSRRRRRRR; Frame “low skew”, in contrast, corresponded to a 
situation in which a risk-neutral agent would switch his/her decision from treatment A (safe 
option) to treatment B (risky option) in row number eight, as indicated by the following pattern 
SSSSSSSSRRR. Appendix D provides information on how the multiple price list procedure was 
implemented, first in the case of frame “high skew” and, later, in the case of frame “low skew” 
for health context 1 (years of life). 
 
3.5. The rewards 
All participants in the experiment received a participation fee. The fee amounted to 5 Euros for 
participants in the “real group” and 15 Euros for those in the “hypothetical group”.
12
 In the 
hypothetical group, decisions did not involve additional payments. In the real group, decisions 
were incentivized and the subjects’ choices in the two MPL tasks with health outcomes had 
“real” consequences for patients outside the lab, which offered an incentive to the participants 
to take the patient’s benefit into account. Subjects in the groups with real payoffs were 
informed that one of them would be randomly selected at the end of the session and one of his 
decisions would be used to compute the amount of money transferred to the Vicente Ferrer 
Foundation. It was explained that the Vicente Ferrer Foundation is an internationally known 
non-profit institution that works in Annantapur, India, where the institution has built up a 
network of health services for the poorest populations. As the main aim of this experiment was 
                                                           
12
On average all participants obtained a payment of 15 euros, since those individuals assigned to the real group received additional money 
depending on their choices in Part 1 of the experiment. 



































































to analyze whether risk attitudes are context-dependent in the health domain, we designed 
payments in such a way that differences in subjects' choices could be attributed only to 
differences of health context and not to changes in the size of the rewards. For this end, we 
established a monetary equivalence between different health outcomes (years of life gained in 
perfect health/months of life gained in moderate ill-health/hours of pain alleviated) of 4 euros 
per time unit.
13
 In addition, subjects were made aware that, if selected, they could benefit 
patients in Annantapur with a payment of up to 156€.  
 
3.6. Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was programmed with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the 
Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) in May 2014.
14
 The laboratory 
recruited a total of 257 undergraduate students from the University of Valencia following 
standard electronic recruitment procedures. None of the subjects had participated in a similar 
economic experiment before. 
We conducted 5 sessions of approximately 45 minutes at the lab to collect the data. Students 
were allocated to one of the 24 potential treatments using quotas so as to have 
(approximately) the same number of observations for each treatment. Within each treatment a 
2:1 ratio was maintained between health and non-health students. Sessions 1, 2 and 3 dealt 
with health contexts 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Within each group of students, each computer was 
assigned one of the 8 potential treatments (2 rewards groups x 4 task sequences). In sessions 4 
and 5 all health contexts were used. In this case, students were allocated to one of the 24 
potential treatments until the quota was full. Table 2 below summarizes the allocation of the 
participants in health context 1 (n=85). A similar allocation was made in the other two health 
contexts (n=86 each). 
                                                           
13
 An interesting extension of our study would be to investigate whether individuals’ risk attitudes within the same health context might vary 
according to the life horizon faced by their patients. Physicians, for instance, may be more or less risk averse within an end-of-life context 
depending on whether the magnitude of patients’ remaining life expectancy is shorter or longer (weeks instead of a few months, or days 
instead of a few weeks, for instance). Investigating this issue would likely require a recalibration of payments in the real group in order to 
measure all the outcomes in the same unit. We leave this question open for future research.  
14
 Previously we performed a pre-test with 45 students of economics at the Public University of Navarra to confirm that the experiment 
instructions were clear and the answers did not present any major problems. 



































































[Insert Table 2] 
The experimental procedure in all sessions was as follows: upon arrival, subjects were randomly 
assigned to cubicles, where they responded to the questions in full anonymity. The general 
instructions of the experiment were read aloud. Once the experiment started, specific 
instructions were shown to participants on the screens of their computers. 
Subjects were privately paid at the end of the experiment. In addition, a total of 341 euros was 
transferred to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation. This amount reflects the money earned in the 
experiment as a result of the medical choices of the selected participants in the groups with 
real payoffs. To validate the actual transfer of money to the foundation, an email was sent to all 
participants after the experiment with a scanned copy of the check showing the total amount 
collected. Experimental instructions are provided in Appendices B, C, D and E. 
4. Methods 
We assume that risk preferences can be represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 




     (1) 
We can infer r based on the 11 decisions made by the individual in each of the two frames 
analyzed. When individuals switch from the safe option (treatment A) to the risky option 
(treatment B), an interval is elicited where the risk aversion parameter r is located. 
As in H&L (2002), we can find the lower ( ) and upper bound ( ) of the interval of r 
associated to the switching point k’. If denotes the probability of the best health outcome in 
each of the decision rows k, with  , then we can define  and  as: 
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 Depending on the value of r, individuals exhibit different degrees of risk aversion in the health domain that can be grouped into three types: 
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Table 3 reports the implicit r intervals for the two skewed frames described in the experimental 
design section. For subjects with multiple switching points we follow Andersen et al. (2006). 
Thus, when individuals go back and forth between safe and risky options as they move along 
the decision rows, we assume they are indifferent to the options in the intermediate decision 
rows, and therefore we define  using the first switch and using the last switch. For 
example, someone might have the following preferences: SSSRSRRRRRR, that is, three safe 
choices, then risk in the fourth row, back to safe in the fifth row and, finally, switch to risk from 
sixth to 11th. In this case =-0.27 and =0.83 for Frame “high skew”. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion of individual i  can be assumed to be a linear function 
of individual characteristics and a stochastic term , as defined in equation (2).  
    (2) 
Individual characteristics  include whether the subject is enrolled in a health related degree, 
age, gender, self-reported health status, weekly disposable income and level of education of 
his/her parents, among others. 
Since the only observable data is the interval , inferences about  and predictions of 
ri can be obtained using an interval regression model as described by Harrison et al. (2005). In 
particular, , which is used to estimate the 
model via maximum likelihood. The error term is assumed to follow a normal distribution with 





to infinity. The  parameter related to the dummy variable “health related major” is used to 
test the effect of the type of degree on the coefficient of risk aversion (research question 2 
described in Section 2). 
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In order to answer research questions 1 and 3 (see Section 2) we add a set of dummy variables 
 reflecting the design of the experiment. That is, we use model (3): 
    (3) 
Three sets of dummy variables are used. First, to test the effect of monetary incentives we 
include a dummy variable  where  for the hypothetical group and  for the 
group with financial incentives. The null hypothesis,  = 0, indicates that financial incentives do 
not influence the magnitude of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The second set 
corresponds to the health context (health gains in years of life, months of life, or hours of 
avoided pain). Finally, another set of dummies  indicates the task sequence assigned to the 
subject, which is used to test for order effects. 
We test for frame-related biases (what we call “skewness effects”) by exploiting the within-
subjects design of the experiment. As in Andersen et al. (2006), we use the two skewed frames 
faced by all individuals to form a panel of observations. Let  be the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of individual i (i=1,…,N) inferred from frame t (t=H,L). Equation (3) can now be 
rewritten as: 
  (4) 
Where  if individual i performs frame “high skew”, and 0 otherwise.  is an individual 
random effect that captures unobserved individual variables and allows for the correlation of 
responses from the same subject (Harrison and Ruström, 2008b). The random effect is, by 
assumption, uncorrelated to observed variables ,  and . Equation (4) is estimated via 
panel data interval regression model. The skewness effect is tested by inference of parameter
. The null hypothesis, , suggests that the skewed-high or low frames do not affect the 
magnitude of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, thus indicating no skewness effect. 
 
5. Data and Results 
5.1. Characteristics of individuals 
iE
i i i ir X E eβ θ= + +











































































Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of all individuals participating in the experiment. The 
average age of subjects was 23; 61% were female and 69% were students from medicine and 
other health-related majors. The two columns of table 4 show the characteristics of the 
participants separated by health-related and non-health related majors.
16
 There were slightly 
more females in health-related vs. non-related majors (69% versus 47%), and most subjects 
were in their fourth year of studies. The table also includes individual characteristics (e.g. age, 
gender, labor activity, etc.), characteristics of the experimental design as described in Section 3, 
and the proportion of multiple switches by frame, which was similar between health and non-
health related students (9% versus 10%). 
[Insert Table 4] 
5.2.Data Quality 
The data consists of 514 observations (257 subjects performing two task frames). Table 5 shows 
the distribution of safe choices according to contexts and frames. There is clearly a change in 
the pattern of responses from one frame to the other as rationality dictates, that is, when the 
best outcome of the R lottery is 19, subjects chose the S lottery more often than when it is 39. 
The proportion of inconsistent choices is 9.3% of the total sample (N=48). It includes choices by 
subjects who switched several times (5.6%, N=29), choices by non-switchers (1.7%, N=9) and 
choices by those who select the risky choice in the first decision row (1.9%, N=10).
17 
 Notice that 
the proportion of multiple switchers is small compared to the range of 6% to 21% found in 




[Insert Table 5] 
 
5.3. Estimation of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion and results 
                                                           
16 Health-related majors include students of medicine (n=62, or 35% of health-related students), nursing (n=39, 22%), physiotherapy (n=35, 
20%), pharmacy (n=14, 8%), and odontologists (n=28, 16%). 
17 Multiple switchers and non-switchers that select the risky choice in the first decision row are included in the 1.9%. 
18 According to the recent survey by Filippin and Crosetto (2016) the proportion of multiple switchers is about 10% in experiments using the 
H&L elicitation method. 



































































Table 6 reports the elicited coefficients of relative risk aversion as a result of an interval 
regression where we control for individual and experimental design characteristics.
19 
The table 
presents individual regressions for the skewed-high and the skewed-low frames, as well as an 
unbalanced panel data regression that combines both frames, assuming a random effect. In 
general, the estimates of the combined frames (column c) fall within the interval defined by the 
estimates of the skewed-high (column a) and skewed-low (column b) frames.
20
 
Of the 514 observations, nine (1.7% of the sample) were excluded from the estimation. These 
correspond to choices by those who selected the risky choice in the first decision row and then 
either switched to safe choices or continued with risky choices in the following decision rows, 
which prevents us from obtaining their implicit coefficient of relative risk aversion.
21
 The 
unbalanced panel data includes a total of 255 subjects and 505 observations.
22
 
Table 6 shows that the health context where individuals decide on hours of pain alleviated for 
their patients is associated with higher risk aversion. This result is statistically significant for the 
skewed-high frame (column a) and for the estimation that combines both frames (column c), 
where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher in context 3 compared to context 1 by a 
margin of 0.348 points. No statistical differences are found between the other two contexts. 
This result responds to our first research question. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Individual characteristics barely affect the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, one 
important result that allows us to respond to research question 2 is that being enrolled in a 
medical degree or other health field increases the coefficient of relative risk aversion by 0.308 
                                                           
19 We also tested for interaction effects between contexts and hypothetical and real groups and between these groups and skewness effects. 
We did not find statistically significant interactions effects and the average coefficient of relative risk aversion estimated for the model with and 
without interaction effects does not show statistically significant differences either (1.5635 versus 1.5632). 
20
 The interval regression model was also estimated in a stepwise manner: first, without controls, then, adding controls one by one. Results 
obtained in the model with all the variables and controls included are mostly similar to the ones obtained from the regression without controls 
and those obtained in the intermediate regressions. 
21 Two subjects showed this anomalous behavior in both frames and as result their corresponding four observations were excluded from the 
sample. Another five subjects made this anomalous choice only in one of the two frames, so just their five corresponding observations were 
excluded. Notice that we included, however, one observation where the risky choice is chosen in the first decision row but then there are 
multiple switches. In this case, we estimated the coefficient of relative risk aversion by considering the first row where the subject switched 
from a safe to a risky decision. 
22 If we exclude all multiple switchers and non-switchers from our sample, the results hold and we do not find statistically significant 
differences between the average coefficient of relative risk aversion in the two estimations (1.5635 versus 1.5418). 



































































points (Table 6, column c), i.e. students in health-related fields seem to be more risk averse 
than those in non-health-related fields. However, this result is not observed in the skewed-high 
frame, where the difference is negligible. 
Table 6 also indicates that, when real payments are used, the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is lowered by 0.377 points (column c), which addresses research question 3. This 
result is observed in the individual regressions by frames and also in the regression that 
combines both frames. Our results also show a non-statistically significant order effect. 
 
5.4. Skewness effects 
In Table 6 we find a statistically significant skewness effect. The implicit coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is 0.384 points lower in the skewed-low frame compared to the skewed-high 
frame (column c). To further explore the skewness effect, we present the kernel distribution of 
predicted ri by skewed frame. Predicted ri are based on interval regression estimation of 
equation (3) for each frame, whose parameter estimates are also presented in columns a and b 
of Table 6. The average coefficients of relative risk aversion are estimated to be 1.72 and 1.43 
when based on skewed-high frame and skewed-low frame, respectively; when both frames are 
combined in the panel data interval regression the average coefficient of relative risk aversion 
is 1.56. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of ri in the skewed-high frame is not only located to 
the right, avoiding negative values of r, but it is also less disperse, with values more 
concentrated around the mean.
 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
5.5. Discussion 
Our analysis of the risk preferences across different types of medical decisions made on behalf 
of a patient yields several interesting results for discussion. 



































































First, we find that preferences show a high degree of risk aversion in all health contexts, with 
risk-averse preferences in nearly 100% of the subjects. This is a new and potentially significant 
result because almost every other paper that has measured risk aversion in health has shown a 
mixture of attitudes toward risk (VdP&R, 2012; Schosser et al 2016). The result is also 
outstanding because it was obtained even when one of the frames, the skewed-low frame, 
invited subjects to show risk-seeking preferences. The divergence of results could also be 
related to the fact that we focused on decisions for others, while previous works did not. Thus, 
our prevalence of risk aversion would be in line with the findings in Ubel et al (2011) and 
Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2012), namely that doctors more often select a safer medical 
treatment for their patients than for themselves. 
Second, we find differences between medical contexts since individuals are even more risk 
averse in decisions involving hours of pain alleviated than in the other two contexts. This result 
is surprising, as one might expect that if the number of QALYs involved is smaller, as it is in this 
context, risk aversion should be also smaller (as happens with monetary outcomes). We 
wonder whether our result is driven by the fact that participants in the experiment saw an 
outcome of hours of pain as more plausible and real than an outcome involving shortened life 
expectancy, and were therefore more cautious in the former context. Whatever the 
explanation, our result seems to indicate that some of the economic theory predictions on 
attitudes towards risk with monetary outcomes may have limited validity when applied to 
health outcomes. Further, the fact that our results indicate that subjects treat pain differently 
to other health outcomes (at least when making decisions for others), calls into question the 
adequacy of the QALY model when it is used to represent preferences of outcomes involving 
pain (very common in health problems). This is a significant finding, given that the QALY model 
is the dominant method for the economic evaluation of medical treatments. In fact, Mehrez 
and Gafni (1989) used examples with pain to show the limitations of the QALY model, 
suggesting, instead, an alternative such as the Healthy Year Equivalent. More recently, Schosser 
et al. (2016) showed that preferences for duration of pain are different than preferences for 
intensity of pain. Our findings are aligned with this evidence and suggest that the same utility 
function should not be used for all kinds of health outcomes. The utility function for health, 



































































even if it is a QALY-type utility function, should use different parameters for different health 
outcomes. 
Thirdly, the fact that students in health-related degrees seem to be more risk averse than those 
of other degrees implies that doctors can be highly risk-averse within the context of their 
medical practice. There are two potential explanations for this finding: the self-selection of risk-
averse students in health-related degrees and/or the possibility that health-related students 
have a better understanding of the health decisions they confront. In fact, because participants 
in the experiment answered H&L questionnaires in both the monetary domain and the health 
domain, we were able to compare these questionnaires and found that health-related students 
are more risk-averse than non-health related students in the health domain but less risk-averse 
in the monetary domain (see Appendix A for these results).
23
 This result calls into question the 
linearity of the QALY model, which assumes risk neutrality (Loomes and Mckenzie, 1989). Other 
papers have already questioned the linearity assumption of the QALY model when subject 
make decisions for themselves (e.g., Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; Schosser et al., 2016); we 
question the linearity assumption when subjects make medical decisions as agents for others. 
Fourth, our results show a lower degree of risk aversion in the group with real payoffs. This 
result contrasts with previous findings in the money domain (H&L, 2002, 2005 and Harrison and 
Rutström, 2008b), where opposite results are found. We can think that real rewards caused 
subjects to take the experimental task more seriously, so that the change in risk attitudes is the 
consequence of more careful deliberation about the health consequences for patients. 
However, we do not find that real pay-offs led to fewer inconsistencies. Also, subjects in the 
hypothetical group took longer to respond to the MPL tasks (178 SEC VS 140 SEC, P<0.01), 
which seems to confirm that they took at least the same interest in responding than the 
subjects with real payoffs. An alternative explanation may be that our participants in the 
experiment saw a real patient in India as too distant, affecting the credibility of the rewards 
and/or decreasing the perceived size of the rewards and leading, as a result, to less risk 
                                                           
23
We need to be cautious when interpreting this comparison between H&L in the monetary domain and the H&L in the health domain, since 
the first one was designed just as a practice exercise for participants and as a result participants were playing for themselves (and not for others 
as in the H&L in the health domain) and the lotteries were not skewed as they were for the health domain. 



































































aversion. Recent findings in the literature indicate that there is a negative correlation between 
risk aversion and aversion to inequality or inclination towards social preferences in a context of 
giving donations or giving to others (Müller and Rau 2016). This might explain the fact that 
individuals are willing to take more risk (i.e. are less risk-averse) when real money can be 
transferred to a NGO, as opposed to a hypothetical situation where no real money is involved. 
In any case, whatever the reason, the effect (change in the coefficient of risk aversion) was not 
very large. Other studies find no differences between hypothetical groups and groups with real 
payoffs as mentioned in the introduction. Thus, this seems to be an issue that needs further 
exploration. 
Finally, the two skewed frames produced different degrees of risk aversion. The vast majority of 
subjects had a higher degree of risk aversion in the skewed-high frame, which shows that 
skewness effects did occur. However, the effects were not very important: on aggregate the 
difference between the two means (1.72 vs. 1.45) does not seem notable. Even with skewness 
effects, we can definitely say that there is evidence of risk aversion in the health domain. 
Several limitations of this study deserve mention here. One is related to the effect of monetary 
incentives. When answering the H&L in the health domain with real pay-offs, it is possible that 
subjects first convert the health outcomes into money, while subjects in the hypothetical group 
focus simply on the health outcomes. In this case, the difference between real and hypothetical 
groups might be the result of differential risk attitudes between health and monetary 
outcomes, and not due to the incentives. To ascertain the likelihood of this conversion, we have 
compared answers to H&L questionnaires in the monetary and health domains, observing a 
higher average risk-aversion coefficient in the health domain (see Appendix A). In both cases, 
there are differences between the real and hypothetical groups. However, in the monetary 
domain subjects are more risk averse in the group with real pay-offs as compared to the 
hypothetical group, while the opposite occurs in the health domain. Given this result, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the group with real pay-offs in the health domain is 
monetizing the health outcomes.
24
 This result shows that introducing the right monetary 
                                                           
24
Again, comparisons between the monetary and the health domains should be made with caution. See footnote 24.  



































































incentives when dealing with health decisions is a challenge that needs further exploration. 
Another key question of experimental design was to establish the marginal rate of substitution 
between health and money. We established a monetary equivalence of 4 euros per time unit 
(years/months/hours) for each of the three different health contexts. This rate of exchange was 
chosen so that the total amount that could be transferred to the NGO would be perceived as 
substantial by the participants. However, Galizzi et al. (2016b) followed a different approach 
that established one day of full health as equivalent to one monetary unit. Establishing this kind 
of equivalence is not a trivial exercise and it should be noted that different approaches can lead 
to different results.  
Finally, we wish to acknowledge two methodological limitations. The first is related to our use 
of the Expected Utility framework, which prevents us from considering probability 
transformations in our model (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Thus, it is possible that some of 
the risk aversion we observed could be attributed to probability transformations. However, it is 
also true that preference representations that employ probability transformations are mainly 
relevant when the probability of the event is near to the end-points 0 and 1 (there is no 
behavioral bias when events are certain or impossible), and in this paper we do not consider 
probabilities of events near to 0 and 1. The second limitation is related to estimation strategy: 
our panel data interval regression approach relies on the assumption of a CRRA utility function 
and does not model explicitly behavioral errors. However, the literature shows that our 
approach produces relatively consistent estimates of CRRA coefficients (Harrison and Rutström, 
2008b). Additional approaches such as structural estimation methods could complement and 
enrich this type of approach, but these are more commonly used with more flexible utility 
functions or when utility functions include more than one parameter (see, e.g., Anderson et 
al., 2008), which is not our case. 
 
6.  Conclusion and future research 
Although it is widely recognized that individual risk attitudes are an important factor in the 
health domain, risk attitudes in medical decisions for others have hardly been studied, and 



































































elicitation techniques that are widely used in economics—such as the multiple price list—have 
not been applied systematically. 
In this paper we carried out a lab experiment that investigated the risk attitudes of a group of 
257 individuals who were assigned the role of a physician deciding between treatments for a 
patient. Our main goal was to elicit their risk preferences for others and test whether this 
individual risk attitude is context dependent. We used three different decision contexts with 
health gains expressed in (i) years of life in perfect health, (ii) months of life in moderate-ill 
health for patients with reduced life expectancy, and (iii) hours of pain alleviated, and elicited 
risk preferences for each context using a multiple price list method. 
Results of our study shed light on issues hardly explored until now and also raise interesting 
questions for future research. First, our results indicate that when decisions are made on behalf 
of a third party, the introduction of real rewards seems to decrease risk aversion. In our 
experiment, participants’ decisions determined the monetary rewards that were to be 
transferred to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation. It would be interesting to explore alternative 
ways to incentivize medical decisions on behalf of a third party, as well as analyze how different 
incentives for physicians influence their risk preferences and treatment choices when making 
decisions for others. Secondly, future research should also explore why our results find such a 
large prevalence of risk aversion, unlike previous findings in the field of health. A 
comprehensive study that uses the same preference elicitation method to compare medical 
decisions for self-treatment versus treatment for others within different health contexts would 
help to clarify some of the issues and questions raised in the discussion. Finally, it is important 
to question the extent to which responses to a task like the MPL can predict risk preferences in 
real-life decisions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the H&L method overcomes some of the 
disadvantages of standard gamble methods, which are the most commonly used methods to 
elicit preferences towards health risks. At the same time, it is a feasible and convenient method 
that typical subjects (i.e. university students) can use without much confusion. But whether 
doctors are really so risk averse in practice is a question that needs further exploration. Galizzi 
et al., 2016b conducted a frame field experiment that found mild but significant risk aversion 



































































among doctors in the health domain, and a more pronounced risk aversion in the monetary 
domain. Moreover, the question of whether risk preferences that are elicited in laboratories 
using small populations and relatively low stakes can be transferred to medical contexts is a 
contentious issue in the experimental economics literature (Charness et al., 2013) and reflects a 
wider debate concerning the validity of lab experiments for explaining behaviors in natural 
settings (see Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015; Gallizzi and Wiesen, in press). As Galizzi and Wiesen 
(in press) remark, behavioral and experimental health economists must confront the challenge 
of establishing the external validity and generalizability of laboratory results. Indeed, the 
comparison of experimental results with data from the field is an important area for future 
investigation.  
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Table 1: Summary of Groups Design. 
HEALTH CONTEXTS Rewards Task Order Total 
subgroups 
Health Context 1 
(years of life in 
perfect health) 
G1 HYPOTHETICAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
G1 REAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
Health Context 2 
(months of life in 
moderate ill-health) 
G2 HYPOTHETICAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
G2 REAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
Health Context 3 
(hours of pain 
alleviated) 
G2HYPOTHETICAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
G2 REAL 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l  3-2l-2h 4 
      24 
 
  



































































Table 2: Allocation of Subjects in Health Context 1 
 
Health Context 1 (years in perfect 
health) 
N= 85 
Real payoffs N=42 Hypothetical Payoffs N=43  









Skewed-high first, skewed-low second 8 3 8 3 22 
Skewed-high second, skewed-low first 7 4 7 4 22 
Skewed-high second, skewed-low third 7 4 7 4 22 
Skewed-high third, skewed-low second 7 2 7 3 19 
Total 29 13 29 14 85 
 
  



































































Table 3. Implicit intervals of relative risk aversion by frame 
Number of safe 
choices 






1 -∞<r≤-0.93  -∞<r<=-4.79 
2 -0.93<r≤-0.27  -4.79<r≤-3.39 
3 -0.27<r≤0.16  -3.39<r≤-2.52 
4 0.16<r≤0.51  -2.52<r≤-1.85 
5 0.51<r≤0.83  -1.85<r≤-1.28 
6 0.83<r≤1.15  -1.28<r≤-0.73 
7 1.15<r≤1.49  -0.73<r≤-0.17 
8 1.49<r≤1.9  -0.17<r≤0.47 
9 1.9<r≤2.52  0.47<r≤1.36 
10 2.52<r≤3.37  1.36<r≤2.61 
11 3.37<r≤∞  2.61<r≤∞ 
 
  










































































Age 23.53 (5.51) 23.43 (7.39) 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) 0.47 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 
Health status (1=Excellent, 2=Very good, 3=Good, 4=Regular, 5=Poor) 2.18 (0.80) 1.99 (0.76) 
Labor activity last week, none 0.72 (0.45) 0.79 (0.41) 
Labor activity last week, part time (less than 15 hours) 0.18 (0.38) 0.13 (0.34) 
Labor activity last week, full time (more than 15 hours) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 
Weekly disposable income (in Euros) 39.96 (62.72) 56.38 (74.47) 
Year in college (1st to 7th year) 3.57 (2.00) 3.64 (2.26) 
Grade of access to college (scale 0 to 1) 0.68 (0.13) 0.76 (0.10) 
Number of people per room in household 0.56 (0.21) 0.56 (0.28) 
Education of father (0=none, 1=school, 2=college, 3=post-graduate) 1.47 (0.71) 1.74 (0.75) 
Education of mother (0=none, 1=school, 2=college, 3=post-graduate) 1.44 (0.66) 1.74 (0.62) 
Experimental design 
Order 1 (skewed-high first, skewed-low second), fraction 0.23 (0.42) 0.27 (0.45) 
Order 2 (skewed-high second, skewed-low first), fraction 0.30 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43) 
Order 3 (skewed-high second, skewed-low third), fraction 0.30 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43) 
Order 4 (skewed-high third, skewed-low second), fraction 0.17 (0.37) 0.26 (0.44) 
Health context 1 (health gain in years), fraction 0.34 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) 
Health context 2 (health gain in months), fraction 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 
Health context 3 (health gain in reduced hours of pain), fraction 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 
Payoff to patients (0=hypothetical, 1=real) 0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
Multiple switches in frame “high skew”, fraction 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.26) 
Multiple switches in frame “low skew”, fraction 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.32) 
Sample size, n=257. Mean and standard deviations in parentheses. All 257 individuals performed two 
frames: high skew and low skew. 
  



































































Table 5. Distribution of Safe Choices by Health Context and Frames (in percentages) 
Number of safe 
choices 
Health context 1 
(years perfect health) 
Health context 2 
(months moderate ill-health)  
Health context 3 
















Frame   
“low 
skew” 
1 1.2 3.5 2.3 2.3 1.2 1.2 
2 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.3 1.2 
3 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.0 1.2 
4 5.9 0.0 2.3 0.0 7.0 1.2 
5 12.9 2.4 9.3 5.8 7.0 1.2 
6 22.4 10.6 16.3 10.5 16.3 8.1 
7 9.4 9.4 19.8 8.1 14.0 5.8 
8 21.2 14.1 14.0 8.1 15.1 14.0 
9 12.9 16.5 18.6 18.6 11.6 17.4 
10 7.1 18.8 7.0 22.1 8.1 17.4 
11 4.7 23.5 8.1 23.3 17.4 31.4 























































































Age -0.014 -0.037 -0.025 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) 0.015 -0.287 -0.136 
Health status (1=Excellent, 2=Very good, 3=Good, 
4=Regular, 5=Poor) 
-0.106 -0.091 -0.107 
Labor activity last week, part time (less than 15 hours) 0.123 0.226 0.177 
Labor activity last week, full time (more than 15 hours) -0.240 -0.203 -0.249 
Weekly disposable income (in Euros) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Health related major (0=no health related, 1=health 
related) 
0.036 0.684*** 0.308* 
Year in college (1st to 7th year) 0.026 0.091 0.052 
Grade of access to college (scale 0 to 1) -0.218 -0.48- -0.283 
Number of people per room in household 0.400 0.795 0.603* 
Education of father (0=none, 1=school, 2=college, 3=post-
graduate) 
0.045 0.089 0.056 
Education of mother (0=none, 1=school, 2=college, 
3=post-graduate) 
0.040 -0.132 -0.038 
Experimental design characteristics 
Order 2 (skewed high second, skewed low first) -0.153 -0.360 -0.226 
Order 3 (skewed high second, skewed low third) 0.154 0.149 0.148 
Order 4 (skewed high third, skewed low second) 0.186 -0.535 -0.119 
Health context 2 (health gain in months) 0.143 0.121 0.091 
Health context 3 (health gain in reduced hours of pain) 0.315** 0.389 0.348** 
Payoff to patients (0=hypothetical, 1=real) -0.225* -0.522** -0.377*** 
Frame “low skew”   -0.384*** 
Multiple switches 0.237 -0.513 0.268 
Constant 1.744*** 2.01* 2.796*** 
Standard deviation of individual random effect   0.894*** 
Standard deviation of error term 0.944*** 1.589*** 0.910*** 
(a) Interval regression for skewed-high frame. Sample size is 254. Log-likelihood value is -528.37. (b) Interval regression for  
skewed-low frame. Sample size is 251. Log-likelihood value is -423.64. (c) Unbalanced panel data interval regression combining 
the skewed-high and skewed-low frames. A total of 255 individuals are included in the estimation. Total sample size is 505. Log 
likelihood value is -953.96. Wald test of null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a chi-square value of 51.58 (p-
value<0.01). The fraction of the total variance error associated to random individual effect is 0.492 (standard error is 0.05). * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
  



































































Figure 1. Kernel Distribution of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion by Frame 
 
Probability density estimation based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure 
represents the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, predicted by 
the Interval regression estimates, for the skewed-high frame (N=254) and the 







































































Appendix A: Kernel distribution for H&L in the monetary domain and in the health domain 
 
This appendix compares predicted coefficients of relative risk aversion based on H&L in the 
monetary domain and H&L in the health domain. Predicted coefficients were obtained from the 
interval regression estimations by i) type of students (health-related students versus non-
health-related students), and ii) type of payoffs (real versus hypothetical payoffs). 
 
Figures A.1 and A.2 show the kernel distribution of the relative risk reduction coefficient, by 
type of student, for the monetary domain and the health domain, respectively. The results 
show that health-related students are less risk-averse than non-health related students in the 
monetary domain (r=0.665 Vs. r=0.832, mean coefficient of relative risk aversion of health-
related Vs. non-health-related field, respectively), but more risk-averse in the health domain 
(r=1.654 Vs. r=1.336, mean coefficient of relative risk aversion of health-related Vs. non-health-
related field, respectively). 
 
Figure A.1. Kernel Distribution of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion: 
medical Vs. non-medical student in the monetary domain 
 
 
Probability density estimation based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure 
represents the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion based on the 
H&L in the monetary domain. Coefficients are predicted by the Interval regression 
estimates, for students in a health-related field (N=178) and students in a non-
health-related field (N=78). 




































































Figure A.2. Kernel Distribution of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion: 
medical vs. non-medical student in the health domain 
 
 
Probability density estimation based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure 
represents the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion based on the 
H&L in the health domain. Coefficients are predicted by the Interval regression 
estimates, combining the skewed-high and skewed-low frames, for students in a 
health-related field (N=351) and students in a non-health-related field (N=154). 
 
 
Figures A.3 and A.4 show the kernel distribution of coefficient of relative risk reduction, by type 
of payoffs, for the monetary domain and the health domain, respectively. The results show that 
subjects in the real payoffs are more risk-averse than those in the hypothetical payoffs when 
they are in the monetary domain (r=0.566 Vs. r=0.872, mean coefficient of relative risk aversion 
of real payoff group Vs. hypothetical payoff group, respectively), but more risk-averse in the 
health domain (r=1.756 Vs. r=1.365, mean coefficient of relative risk aversion of real payoff 













































































Figure A.3. Kernel Distribution of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion: 
hypothetical vs. real in the monetary domain 
 
Probability density estimation based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure 
represents the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, based on the 
H&L in the monetary domain. Coefficients are predicted by the Interval regression 
estimates, for subjects in the real payoffs group (N=128) and in the hypothetical 
payoff group (N=128). 
 
Figure A.4. Kernel Distribution of Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion: 
hypothetical Vs. real in the health domain 
 
 
Probability density estimation based on an Epanechnikov kernel function. The figure 
represents the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, based on the 
H&L in the health domain. Coefficients are predicted by the Interval regression 
estimates, combining the skewed-high and skewed-low frames, for subjects in the 
real payoffs group (N=254) and in the hypothetical payoff group (N=251). 
  







































































[The general instructions were given to the participants before the start of the experiment. The original 
instructions were presented in Spanish; the following is a translated version. These instructions were 





         I N S T R U C TIONS 
This is an experiment to study how individuals make decisions. We are only interested in what 
individuals make on average. Keep in mind that we do not expect any particular behavior from 
you. However, be aware that your decisions throughout the experiment may influence your 
earnings. You can ask questions at any time; please, raise your hand and wait to be helped. Any 
communication among you is prohibited and subject to immediate exclusion from the 
experiment. 
 
• You are about to participate in a study funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. In 
this study we are analyzing some aspects of medical decision-making, which will give us a better 
understanding of the relationship between doctors and patients, and contribute to the design of 
appropriate health policies. Pay attention, please, to these instructions because your answers are very 
important. We thank you in advance for your cooperation. 
• This experiment consists of three phases. In the first phase you will face a number of monetary 
decisions, while in the other two phases you will take health decisions. Before starting each phase, you 
will receive a set of specific instructions for that phase. 
• At the completion of the three phases of the experiment, we will ask you to complete a short 
questionnaire and you will be announced the earnings that were generated with the decisions you 
made. 
• By answering all our questions you will receive a payment of 5 Euros in cash at the end of the 
experiment. Also you can get additional money depending on the choices you make. At each phase we 
will explain what determines the payments and how they are realized. 
• At the end of the experiment the computer will make three random selections (one for each of the 
three phases of the experiment) to determine payments based on the monetary and health decisions 
that you have made. 
                                                          
25 
Appendix C provides the general instructions and questionnaires to elicit risk aversion with money as outcome for those groups with real 
rewards. Appendix D provides the general instructions and questionnaires to elicit risk aversion with health as outcome for those groups with 
real rewards that were assigned to health context 1. Finally, Appendix E provides general instructions corresponding to the third part of the 
experiment whose data we do not analyze in this paper. Similar to Appendix C and D, Appendix E provides the questionnaires for groups with 
real rewards assigned to health context 1. The questionnaires for the groups with real rewards assigned to health contexts 2 and 3, as well as 
those corresponding to the hypothetical groups, are not included for space reasons but are available upon request. Each of the three different 
health contexts analyzed in the article are described in detail in section 3.3.  



































































• As you can see, the gains from your financial decisions (Phase 1) will be for you, while the gains from 
your health decisions will be allocated to fund real medical treatments. In particular, the money will be 
transferred to Vicente Ferrer Foundation to finance the medical treatments offered by the network of 
health centers that the Foundation manages in Anantapur district, located in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh in India. Vicente Ferrer Foundation is an NGO committed to improving the development of 
the living conditions of the most disadvantaged communities in Andhra Pradesh. 
• We have agreed with Vicente Ferrer Foundation that once completed the experiment, we will make a 
bank transfer for the total amount of the donation. Once the transfer has been made we will inform 
you by email.  
• As everyone has the same opportunity to be paid for their decisions at the end of the experiment, we 
encourage you to choose the option you prefer at any phase, knowing that this option might be 
selected for the final payment.  
• It is very important to know that this is not a test of skills since there is not a best option. The choice 
will depend on your personal preferences, which will not necessarily coincide with those of the rest of 
the participants. 
  



































































Appendix C: multiple price list task with money as outcome for subjects in real rewards 
groups. 
 
[These are the instructions for Part 1 of the experiment. The original instructions were presented in 
Spanish; the following is a translated version. These instructions were identical for all groups with real 
payoffs]. 
 
In this phase of the experiment you have to make 11 choices between two possible options (A and B). 
With Option A, you can receive 10 or 8 Euros. With Option B, you receive 19.25 or 0.5 Euros. As you can 
see, potential outcomes are fixed for the 11 choices, while the probability of gaining one amount or the 
other is different. 
 
Next, we show the screenshot of the example that you will face at this phase. 
 
Decision 1 A: 0% 10 euros ,    100% 8 euros B: 0% 19.25 euros,     100% 0.5 euros 
Decision 2 A: 10% 10 euros,     90% 8 euros B: 10% 19.25  euros,     90% 0.5 euros 
Decision 3 A: 20% 10 euros,     80% 8 euros B: 20% 19.25  euros,     80% 0.5 euros 
Decision 4 A: 30% 10 euros,     70% 8 euros B: 30% 19.25  euros,     70% 0.5 euros 
Decision 5 A: 40% 10 euros,     60% 8 euros B: 40% 19.25  euros,     60% 0.5 euros 
Decision 6 A: 50% 10 euros,     50% 8 euros B: 50% 19.25  euros,     50% 0.5 euros 
Decision 7 A: 60% 10 euros,     40% 8 euros B: 60% 19.25  euros,    40% 0.5 euros 
Decision 8 A: 70% 10 euros,     30% 8 euros B: 70% 19.25  euros,    30% 0.5 euros 
Decision 9 A: 80% 10 euros,     20% 8 euros B: 80% 19.25  euros,    20% 0.5 euros 
Decision 
10 
A: 90% 10 euros,     10% 8 euros B: 90% 19.25 euros,    10% 0.5 euros 
Decision 
11 
A: 100% 10 euros,     0% 8 euros B: 100% 19.25  euros,    0% 0.5 euros 




































































• Please note that in Decision 1, option A implies 8 euros for certain, while option B ensures you 0.5 
euros. At the same time, in Decision 11, option A guarantees 10 euros, while option B guarantees 
19.25. Thus, as you can see, going down the table, option B becomes more attractive, as it increases 
the probability of winning the larger amount (19.25 Euros). Note that in option A the same thing 
happens. 
• It is very important to know that this is not a test of skills since there is not a best option. The choice 
will depend on your personal preferences, which will not necessarily coincide with those of the rest of 
the participants. 
• At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of your 11 choices in part 1 to 
make your payment. 
 
Payments in Part 1 
Suppose, for instance, computer randomly selects Decision 5. 
o Option A: 40% 10 Euros, 60% 8 Euros 
o Option B: 40% 19.25 Euros, 60% 0.5 Euros 
If you have chosen option A you can receive 10 or 8 euros. If you chose option B you can receive 19.25 
or 0.5 euros.  
Thus, afterwards, the computer will randomly select a number between 1 and 11. In both options A and 
B you have 40% of probability of receiving the larger amount of money in each of the options and 60% 
of receiving the lowest amount. Thus, if the computer randomly selects a number lower than 4 you will 
receive the maximum amount, while if the number is larger than 6 you will receive the minimum. 
Suppose for instance that you have chosen Option A. If the computer selects a number between 1 and 4 
(both included), you will receive 10 euros and if the number is between 5 and 10 you will receive 8 
euros. Similarly, if you have chosen Option B, and the computer selects a number between 1 and 4 (both 
included), you will receive 19.25 euros and if the number is between 5 and 10 you will receive 0.5 euros. 
 
Please select one of the options in each of the following 11 decisions. 
 
End Phase I 
 
  



































































Appendix D: Two multiple price list tasks with health as outcome for subjects in real rewards 
groups. 
 
[These are the instructions for Part 2 of the experiment. The original instructions were presented in 
Spanish; the following is a translated version. These instructions were identical for all groups with real 
payoffs that were assigned to the health context 1 (health gains in years of life in perfect health), except 
for the order effects included between frames (skewed high or skewed low) and parts (tasks to elicit risk 
aversion with health as outcome versus task to elicit equity preferences). The results of the equity task 
will be analyzed in a different paper]. 
 
In phases II and III of the experiment we will ask you to imagine what you would do in a number of 
medical decisions. While it is true that in this experiment there are not real patients, we want you to 
think about patients as if they were real. In order to do this, the choices you make in these two phases 
will benefit real patients. In particular, the money earned with your decisions will fund treatments that 
Vicente Ferrer Foundation delivers to patients through its network of health centers in the district of 
Anantapur, in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India. 
In this room there are 32 individuals (including you) facing exactly the same decisions. At the end of the 
experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the participants in order to compute the amount 
of the donation directed to Vicente Ferrer Foundation. The same will be done in Phase III. If you are 
chosen, thus, your decision will determine the health outcomes of your (hypothetical) patients, which in 
turn will imply a transfer of money to Vicente Ferrer Foundation. 
Lastly, as perhaps it may seem that the amount of money you can give to Vicente Ferrer Foundation is 
not high, you should think that in India the cost of many basic treatments to reduce mortality is very 




In this phase of the experiment we ask you to imagine what you would do in a number of medical 
decisions to treat a patient. As you will see, the situation we show you is very simple. We know that, in 
real life, medical decisions are much more complex. Try to respond what you believe you would do in 
each of the cases that are presented.  
 
Let us start with an example of a Decision that you should take at this phase of the experiment.  
 
Suppose you are a doctor you have to treat a middle-aged adult patient having a disease diagnosed with 
certainty. You have to choose between two possible treatments (A and B). In the case of treatment A, if 
it is successful, the patient will gain additional 16 years of life and if it does not work, 12 years. With 
treatment B, if it is successful, the patient will gain 39 additional years and if it goes wrong 4 years. 
Importantly, the patient will enjoy good health the additional years of life. However, the probability of 
going well or badly of each treatment is unknown. That depends on each patient. We present 11 
different choices. In each, the probability that A and B treatments are successful is different. We ask you 
to tell us what treatment you choose in each of the 11 situations. 
 
Next, we show a screenshot of one of the examples that you will face at this phase. 
 



































































 [TABLE CONTEXT a.1] 
Decision 1 A: 0%  16 years of life ,   100%  12 years B: 0% 39 years of life,    100%  4 years 
Decision 2 A: 10%  16 years,     90%  12 years B: 10%  39 years,     90%  4 years 
Decision 3 A: 20%  16 years,     80%  12 years  B: 20%  39 years,     80%  4 years 
Decision 4 A: 30%  16 years,     70%  12 years B: 30%  39 years,     70%  4 years 
Decision 5 A: 40%  16 years,     60% 12 years B: 40%  39 years,     60%  4 years 
Decision 6 A: 50%  16 years,     50%  12 years B: 50%  39 years,     50%  4 years 
Decision 7 A: 60%  16 years,     40%  12 years B: 60%  39 years,     40%  4 years 
Decision 8 A: 70%  16 years,     30% 12 years B: 70%  39 years,     30%  4 years 
Decision 9 A: 80%  16 years,     20% 12 years B: 80%  39 years,     20%  4 years 
Decision 
10 
A: 90%  16 years,     10%  12 years B: 90%  39 years,     10%  4 years 
Decision 
11 
A: 100%  16 years,     0%  12 years B: 100%  39 years,     0%  4 years 
 
• Note that, although the mechanism is similar to the previous one, now what you win or lose is very 
different: years of life in perfect health instead of euros. Options A and B are different and therefore 
probably what you choose in each Decision may be different as well.  
• Remember that at the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of the 32 
participants to compute the payments of this phase of the experiment. Such payments will depend 
on the years of life gained by the patient of the selected participant. We proceed as before:  
• The computer will choose the Decision that is played first.  
• The computer randomly draws a number from 1 to 10 to determine the number of years of life that 
will gain your patient, given your selected treatment.  



































































• Depending on the years in perfect health the patient gained, the donation to Vicente Ferrer 
Foundation will be higher or lower. In particular, to make payments at this phase, we assume that 
an additional year of life in perfect health amounts to 4 Euros.  
o If the patient gains 39 years, Vicente Ferrer Foundation will receive 156 Euros.  
o If the patient gains 16 years Vicente Ferrer Foundation will receive 64 Euros.  
o If the patient gains 12 years Vicente Ferrer Foundation will receive 48 Euros.  
o If the patient gains 4 years Vicente Ferrer Foundation will receive 16 Euros.  
 
In what follows we ask you to tell us which treatment you would choose in each of the following 11 
decisions. 
 
[INSERT TABLE CONTEXT a.1] 
 
The frame we present now also refers to the number of years of life in perfect health that a patient can 
gain. However, the numbers have changed and, therefore, your preferred option for each Decision may 
change too. We ask you to tell us which treatment you would choose in each of these 11 situations that 
we show below. 
If any of them is chosen by the computer to make the payment, the computation is performed as in the 
previous example. In this case, the Vicente Ferrer Foundation will receive 76 Euros, 64 Euros, 48 Euros 
or 16 Euros, if your patient gains 19, 16, 12 or 4 years of life in perfect health respectively. 
 
[TABLE CONTEXT a.2] 
 
Decision 1 A: 0%  16 years of life ,   100%  12 years B: 0% 19 years of life,    100%  4 years 
Decision 2 A: 10%  16 years,     90%  12 years B: 10%  19 years,     90%  4 years 
Decision 3 A: 20%  16 years,     80%  12 years  B: 20%  19 years,     80%  4 years 
Decision 4 A: 30%  16 years,     70%  12 years B: 30%  19 years,     70%  4 years 
Decision 5 A: 40%  16 years,     60% 12 years B: 40%  19 years,     60%  4 years 
Decision 6 A: 50%  16 years,     50%  12 years B: 50%  19 years,     50%  4 years 



































































Decision 7 A: 60%  16 years,     40%  12 years B: 60%  19 years,     40%  4 years 
Decision 8 A: 70%  16 years,     30% 12 years B: 70%  19 years,     30%  4 years 
Decision 9 A: 80%  16 years,     20% 12 years B: 80%  19 years,     20%  4 years 
Decision 
10 
A: 90%  16 years,     10%  12 years B: 90%  19 years,     10%  4 years 
Decision 
11 
A: 100%  16 years,     0%  12 years B: 100%  19 years,     0%  4 years 
 









































































Appendix E: Equity task for subjects in real rewards groups 
 
[These are the instructions for Part 3 of the experiment. The original instructions were presented in 
Spanish; the following is a translated version. These instructions were identical for all groups with real 
payoffs that were assigned to health context 1 (health gains in years of life in perfect health), except for 
the order effects included between frames (skewed high or skewed low) and parts (tasks to elicit risk 
aversion with health as outcome versus tasks to elicit equity preferences). The results of this equity task 





In phase III of the experiment we will ask you to imagine what you would decide in a number of medical 
situations involving the treatment of a group of patients. As you will see, the situation we show you in 
each case is very simple. We know that in real life medical decisions are much more complex. Try to 
respond according to what you believe you would do in each of the cases that are presented.  
 
Suppose you are responsible for deciding which treatment should be provided to a population of 
middle-aged adult patients that have been diagnosed with certainty. Your choice will be the treatment 
protocol all physicians in your area will follow. There are two types of patients, type A and type B, both 
suffering from the same illness. You have to choose between two possible treatments (A and B). 




Increase in life expectancy  Treatment 
  A B 
Type of patient 
A 16 years of life 4 years of life 
B 12 years of life 39 years of life 
 
 
• If a type A patient receives treatment A, then his life expectancy increases by 16 years. 
• If a type B patient receives treatment A, then his life expectancy increases by 12 years. 
• If a type A patient receives treatment B, then his life expectancy increases by 4 years. 
• If a type B patient receives treatment B, then his life expectancy increases by 39 years. 
 
The patient will enjoy good health during the additional years of life. 
 
Notice that in this scenario: 
1. There is no way to know a patient’s type. 
2. Once you provide one treatment, you cannot provide the other. 
 
We present 11 different choices with different population compositions. For simplicity, we assume there 
are 100 patients. We ask you to tell us what treatment the health system should choose to treat these 
patients in each of the 11 situations. 
 







































































composition Treatment A Treatment B 
Decision 1 100 Type A All patients gain 16 years All patients gain 4 years 
Decision 2 
90 Type A 
10 Type B 
90 patients A gain 16 years 
10 patients B gain 12 years 
90 patients A gain 4 years 
10 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 3 
80 Type A 
20 Type B 
80 patients A gain 16 years 
20 patients B gain 12 years 
80 patients A gain 4 years 
20 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 4 
70 Type A 
30 Type B 
70 patients A gain 16 years 
30 patients B gain 12 years 
70 patients A gain 4 years 
30 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 5 
60 Type A 
40 Type B 
60 patients A gain 16 years 
40 patients B gain 12 years 
60 patients A gain 4 years 
40 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 6 
50 Type A 
50 Type B 
50 patients A gain 16 years 
50 patients B gain 12 years 
50 patients A gain 4 years 
50 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 7 
40 Type A 
60 Type B 
40 patients A gain 16 years 
60 patients B gain 12 years 
40 patients A gain 4 years 
60 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 8 
30 Type A 
70 Type B 
30 patients A gain 16 years 
70 patients B gain 12 years 
30 patients A gain 4 years 
70 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 9 
20 Type A 
80 Type B 
20 patients A gain 16 years 
80 patients B gain 12 years 
20 patients A gain 4 years 
80 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 
10 
10 Type A 
90 Type B 
10 patients A gain 16 years 
90 patients B gain 12 years 
10 patients A gain 4 years 
90 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 
11 
100 Type B All patients gain 12 years All patients gain 39 years 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of the 32 participants to compute 
the payments of this phase of the experiment. If you are selected, the computer will randomly choose 
the decision that will determine the consequences of your choice (treatment A or B). As before, the 
choices you make in this phase will benefit real patients. In particular, the money earned with your 
decisions will fund treatments in 10 rural health centers that Vicente Ferrer Foundation manages in the 
district of Anantapur. We assign a number to each health care center in order to assign the amount of 
money to be transferred to each of them. In particular, the donation that will be received by each of the 
health care centers will be based on the health gains obtained by every ten patients.  
 



































































Suppose for instance that the computer randomly selects the following decision: 
 
Decision 2 
90 Type A 
10 Type B 
90 patients A gain 16 years 
10 patients B gain 12 years 
90 patients A gain 4 years 
10 patients B gain 39 years 
 
In this case: 
- If you have chosen treatment A, 90 patients gain 16 years of life and 10 patients 12 years. Thus, 
9 health centers (those numbered 1 to 9) will receive 16 euros and health center number 10 will 
receive 12 euros. 
- If, on the contrary, you choose treatment B, then 90 patients gain 4 years of life and 10 patients 
gain 39. In this case health centers numbered 1 to 9 will receive 4 euros and health center 
number 10 will receive 39 euros. 
 
Once the experiment is over, we will send to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation the money and the 
instructions corresponding to the allocation of funds for each of the health care centers.  





composition Treatment A Treatment B 
Decision 1 100 Type A All patients gain 16 years All patients gain 4 years 
Decision 2 
90 Type A 
10 Type B 
90 patients A gain 16 years 
10 patients B gain 12 years 
90 patients A gain 4 years 
10 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 3 
80 Type A 
20 Type B 
80 patients A gain 16 years 
20 patients B gain 12 years 
80 patients A gain 4 years 
20 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 4 
70 Type A 
30 Type B 
70 patients A gain 16 years 
30 patients B gain 12 years 
70 patients A gain 4 years 
30 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 5 
60 Type A 
40 Type B 
60 patients A gain 16 years 
40 patients B gain 12 years 
60 patients A gain 4 years 
40 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 6 
50 Type A 
50 Type B 
50 patients A gain 16 years 
50 patients B gain 12 years 
50 patients A gain 4 years 
50 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 7 
40 Type A 
60 Type B 
40 patients A gain 16 years 
60 patients B gain 12 years 
40 patients A gain 4 years 
60 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 8 
30 Type A 
70 Type B 
30 patients A gain 16 years 
70 patients B gain 12 years 
30 patients A gain 4 years 
70 patients B gain 39 years 




































































20 Type A 
80 Type B 
20 patients A gain 16 years 
80 patients B gain 12 years 
20 patients A gain 4 years 
80 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 
10 
10 Type A 
90 Type B 
10 patients A gain 16 years 
90 patients B gain 12 years 
10 patients A gain 4 years 
90 patients B gain 39 years 
Decision 
11 
100 Type B All patients gain 12 years All patients gain 39 years 
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